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Abstract  
Fatigue is an important workplace risk management issue. Within the rail industry, the passing of a 
stop signal (signal passed at danger; SPAD) is considered to be one of the most major safety 
breaches which can occur. Train drivers are very aware of the negative consequences associated 
with a SPAD. Therefore, SPADs provide a practical and applied safety relevant context within which 
to structure a discussion on fatigue. Focus groups discussing contributing factors to SPADs were 
undertaken at eight passenger rail organisations across Australia and New Zealand (n = 28 drivers). 
Data relating to fatigue was extracted and inductively analysed identifying three themes: causes, 
consequences, and countermeasures (to fatigue). Drivers experienced negative consequences of 
fatigue, despite existing countermeasures to mitigate it. Organisational culture was a barrier to 
effective fatigue management. A fatigue assessment tool consistently informed rostering, however, 
shift swapping was commonplace and often unregulated, reducing any potential positive impact. In 
discussing fatigue countermeasure strategies, drivers talked interchangeably about mitigating task 
related fatigue (e.g. increasing cognitive load) and sleepiness (e.g. caffeine). Ensuring the concepts of 
fatigue and sleepiness are properly understood has the potential to maximise safety.  
 
Keywords train driving, rail safety, sleep, fatigue  
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1 Introduction 
Fatigue is an important and unique issue for workplace risk management, influenced by both work-
related and non work-related factors (Gander et al. 2011). Although the implications for fatigue in 
transport are well documented, there is a deficit of fatigue research in rail compared with road and 
aviation (Phillips 2014, Anund et al. 2015). In the US for example, the risk of a human factors 
accident is elevated 11-65 percent above chance by exposure to fatigue, and the economic cost of 
an accident when an employee is fatigued is ~$1.5M compared to $400k in the absence of it 
(Gertler, DiFiore & Raslear, 2012). 
As with many other forms of passenger transportation, rail safety relies on the actions and 
vigilance of one individual to safely transport passengers. However, the actions and vigilance of that 
individual do not occur in isolation. Instead they are highly influenced and shaped by the 
sociotechnical system within which the driver operates. For example, management decisions such as 
the length of work shifts impact a driver’s alertness and ability to maintain vigilance. Furthermore, 
vehicle dynamics also contribute to drivers’ actions. In comparison to other land-based transport 
modes (e.g. road) train manoeuvrability is restricted. The weight, forward momentum and stopping 
distances of a train require drivers to perform actions well in advance of a desired response. For 
example, when approaching a speed change, a train driver would typically brake much earlier than 
when they see the sign. Within Australia and New Zealand there is minimal automation of train 
driving operations, thus safe driving relies on prior route knowledge, in order for action to be taken 
before seeing the specific hazard (Naweed et al. 2013).  
Train driving requires high levels of mental effort and maintained concentration over long 
periods (Phillips and Sagberg 2010), but the task is also interspersed with similarly long but highly 
monotonous sections of track with minimal driver input. Such task features represent a high risk for 
fatigue as the monotonous sections required sustained vigilance, which does not allow for recovery 
(Dunn and Williamson 2012), thereby lowering alertness and reducing the ability to react (Larue et 
al. 2011). Furthermore, train drivers are shift workers, which create additional implications for 
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fatigue resulting from sleep loss and disrupted sleep pattern (Åkerstedt 1991). Within Australia, rail 
operators are required to have a fatigue safety management programme (National Rail Safety 
Regulator 2014). A common strategy is to use tools based on biomathematical models to assess 
fatigue when developing rosters, which give scores to identify if a particular shift pattern is likely to 
induce excessive fatigue. Rosters with high fatigue scores are avoided. In the US, the Fatigue 
Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST) is used to assess fatigue, and in Australia, Fatigue Audit InterDyne 
FAID is the commercial assessment tool most commonly used by rail operators. However, the 
efficacy of such shift modelling systems has been questioned due to a lack of controlled intervention 
studies (Anund et al. 2015). 
The aviation industry has published fatigue guidance for pilots, and tips and tools for fatigue 
and sleep management in the air traffic control environment (e.g. Eurocontrol 2005), some of which 
are even described as “a little eccentric” (p.3). While rail collision avoidance has much in common 
with the piloting task in the aviation domain, the driving task itself is a closer parallel to trucking. 
Both are surface transportation modes and both truck and train drivers are required to control 
relatively long and heavy, articulated vehicles; in Australia, heavy haul trains in the Pilbara region are 
routinely more than 3 km in length, whilst country “road trains” comprising a prime mover and three 
semi-trailers are among the longest trucks in the world. The drivers in each mode are also required 
to maintain sustained attention for prolonged periods of time, a task known to induce fatigue 
(Williamson et al. 2011). Lastly, both truck and train drivers are subject to shift work and/or long 
shifts. The subsequent lack of sleep is known to impact on performance. Both time on task fatigue 
and sleepiness due to lack of sleep have been reported as causal factors for truck crashes. Fatigued 
truck drivers who have crashed can be described in two distinct groups: those with regular 
sleep/wake patterns who become fatigued while working, and those with irregular sleep patterns 
who arrive at work fatigued (Young and Hashemi 1996). The commonalities in shift work between 
road and rail suggest that train drivers may be subject to the same vulnerabilities. In particular, 
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reduced period of time between shifts has been shown to reduce the amount of sleep that drivers 
obtain (Kecklund et al. 2003, Kandelaars et al. 2005). 
Another factor which is likely to influence both train and truck drivers is obstructive sleep 
apnoea (OSA). This sleep disorder is common in those with a sedentary lifestyle. For truck drivers the 
presence of OSA is reportedly associated with a 30% increase in crash risk (Howard et al. 2004). 
While similar research has not been identified for train drivers, the prevalence of OSA within the 
driving population is likely to have an impact on fatigue-related safety critical events.  
While inferences can be drawn from the commonalities between road and rail transport, 
there are some clear differences between the truck and rail industry which can limit the relevance of 
findings. For example, within Australia the long distance trucking industry is subject to prescriptive 
maximum driving and shift times. This requires drivers to take regular breaks and not to exceed 
maximum work hours within a set period. In contrast, the rail industry does not universally mandate 
such prescriptive rules surrounding hours of service (Anderson et al. 2013). Furthermore, not all the 
countermeasures to fatigue which truck drivers can use are available to train drives. For example, a 
recognised effective countermeasure to sleepiness is to stop driving and have a nap (Horne and 
Reyner 1996). This option is more achievable for truck drivers who have greater control over their 
journey plan and may be able to pull over in a rest area if needed. Differences between transport 
modes highlight the importance of considering fatigue within the rail context.    
As a ubiquitous rail Work Health & Safety issue, fatigue management is a key topic in Industry 
Standards and Guidelines. As an example, the Rail Safety and Standards Board (2012) has produced a 
comprehensive Good Practice Guide, in order to assist the industry in understanding and complying 
with their duties, and the UK Office of the Rail Regulator (2011) also has a companion guidance 
document on managing fatigue. The primary role of these documents is to guide how substantive 
elevements of safety management systems are designed and to provide a knowledgebase for 
specilist functions (e.g. roster designers, trainers). However, they reflect a rail industry that has 
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differing characteristics to Australia, which has different states and different railways. While the US 
has railways that are much closer to Australia in both design and operation, like the UK industry 
guidelines, their documents do not capture any of the non-compliance or “unpublished” strategies 
that drivers may adopt to manage risk but not report for fear of disciplinary action. These are likley 
to be idiosyncratic to the specific contexts (i.e. Australian rail), thus to capture this data, and gain a 
rich understanding of how fatigue risk and sleepiness is actually managed at the end-user level, the 
driver perspective is needed.   
1.1 Using SPADs to structure a discussion on fatigue 
One of the largest safety breaches in rail occurs when a train passes a stop signal (signal 
passed at danger; SPAD) and moves into a section of track where it has no authority. A SPAD is 
considered to have happened regardless of how far the train has exceeded the signal; this includes 
completely failing to adhere to the signal as well as overshooting by a metre. The Australian and 
New Zealand rail industries have both experienced a steady increase in SPAD frequency over the last 
decade (Naweed et al. 2015a), and as a result, there is very heavy industry focus to implement 
strategies to mitigate SPAD occurrence. This includes national SPAD Mitigation Working Groups 
(Australasian Railway Association 2016) and annual SPAD conferences and forums (e.g. Metro Trains 
Melbourne, 2015). Technologies intended to stop the train in the event that the driver is 
incapacitated, and increase their awareness of signal state and thereby reduce SPAD occurrence 
already exist. These include the Vigilance System (also known as the “Dead Man”), which requires 
immediate response (pressing a button) after prolonged inactivity, and the Automatic Warning 
System (AWS), which requires response to upcoming caution and warning signals. Both of these 
activities further add to the task load of the driver. All Australian and New Zealand passenger 
operators use one or both of these systems as prospective SPAD mitigation systems (Naweed 
2015a), working on the premise that an alert driver will be able to cancel the alarm, and therefore, 
reduce SPAD risk. SPADs are a highly taboo topic in the rail industry and a dominant feature in rail-
oriented research (Naweed 2015a) but the influence of fatigue on SPADs is under investigated. 
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Consequently, train drivers are very aware of SPADs as a safety critical event. This provides a specific 
context within which to evaluate train driver perspective on safety, including fatigue.  
In the future, automation in train driving is likely to increase and lead to more hybrid driver-
train systems, with corresponding increases in the potential for task-induced fatigue. However, the 
shift-working model is likely to remain, and continue to cause circadian and sleep pattern 
interruption (Åkerstedt 1991). Ensuring that fatigue and sleepiness concepts are properly 
understood could be a first step to informing specific interventions to reduce driver fatigue and 
sleepiness. Research related to fatigue has examined the effects of work rosters (Howard and Tepas 
2001) and used observation and self-report to study the effect of journey times greater than six 
hours (Gouin et al. 2001). However the effects of fatigue and shift rosters on performance in rail is 
an area that has been identified as still needing research contribution (Wilson and Norris 2005). 
Recent fatigue-related rail research has shifted its focus to understand sleep quality and quantity in 
naturalistic settings e.g. (Jay et al. 2006, Dorrian et al. 2011) or train handling impairment in 
naturalistic and simulator protocols e.g. (Dorrian et al. 2006, Dorrian et al. 2007). This research has 
focused on safe driving performance and demonstrated that fatigued drivers are an economic 
burden as they have higher rates of fuel consumption.  
Little is known about the impact of fatigue on unsafe train driving events such as SPADs but it 
is likely that fatigued drivers will be at increased risk of a SPAD, particularly if an increase in 
sleepiness is experienced coinciding with the presence of a signal. For example, it is known that 
fatigue increases the predisposition of drivers to distraction (Anderson and Horne 2006) and 
distracted train drivers may for example miss the presence of a stop sign. Fatigue also impairs 
decision making (Harrison and Horne 2000) which is a vital component of safe train driving. The slow 
response of a moving train to driver control input means that decisions about stopping must be 
made early in order to halt a train prior to a stop sign.  As a demonstration of this, Torsvall and 
Akerstedt (1987) note that when monitoring 11 train drivers using physiological measurements 
during a one day and one night journey, two drivers failed to act on a signal during night driving. 
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Closer inspection of the physiological measures for one driver at the time the signal was not 
responded to demonstrate that the driver’s eyes were rolling and electroencephalography (EEG) 
showed bursts of alpha activity which is a clear sign of sleepiness. This pattern was reported to 
continue for a period of 20 seconds during which the signal was missed before normal waking EEG 
and electrooculography (EOG) patterns resumed. 
Driver fatigue has the potential to influence SPADs, however, there has been little research 
specifically focusing on this issue. Furthermore, although the causes of SPADs are a common 
consideration for rail research, the driver’s perspective is rarely sought. To ensure active uptake of 
any strategies for improving fatigue and SPAD management, it is necessary for them to be 
acceptable for the end-user. It should also be noted that there is a lack of consistency in how the 
term fatigue is practically operationalised (Phillips 2015). The situation is further complicated by a 
lack of quantification of when fatigue and/or sleepiness become safety critical (Van Dongen and 
Hursh 2010). The current work focuses on train driver’s perspective of fatigue and therefore a broad 
definition was adopted in order to encapsulate any aspect which they felt was of influence to a 
SPAD, arguably the most safety critical event faced by the rail industry. Fatigue was considered to 
include the inability to continue or the impairment of performance at an activity because it has been 
going on to long (Bartley and Chute 1947) as well as sleepiness, a physiological urge to fall asleep 
resulting from sleep loss or circadian effects (Dement and Carskadon 1982). The aim of the current 
study was to understand more about fatigue and its relationship with SPADs from the drivers’ 
perspective in order to direct future research. The objectives to achieve this were (1) collect and 
transcribe focus group discussions with drivers about SPADs (2) use a thematic approach to identify 
factors associated with fatigue.  
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2 Method 
2.1 Study Design  
This paper reports a specialised analysis of existing focus group data, concentrating on the 
contribution of fatigue to SPADs from the driver’s perspective. Fatigue was one-third of the key non-
technical human-factors dimensions that were covered in the larger dataset, the others being 
distraction and time pressure. The overall findings of the focus group (not specific to fatigue) are 
presented by Naweed (2013) and Naweed et al., (2015a,b).  
The data were collected using a qualitative research technique employing standard semi-
structured focus group methodology (Kreuger 1994, Morgan 1997) to elicit train drivers’ views (i.e. 
on fatigue and its relationship with SPADs). This was selected over the use of formal epidemiologic 
survey methods because it: (1) allowed the investigation and analysis of a broader array of possible 
topics, in this case those that were fatigue-related; (2) provided a semi-structured format for 
obtaining input directly from the train drivers themselves; and (3) permitted the detection of 
heretofore unexpected themes, whereas a predefined questionnaire is limited to evaluating those 
areas explicitly included in the questionnaire. The focus groups process was used as a primer for the 
Scenario Invention Task (Naweed 2012, 2013, 2015a,b), a creative pen-paper drawing task based on 
Checkland’s (1980) “Rich Pictures” approach to help access knowledge. An example scenario 
collected during the study is shown in Figure 1. The task, introduced halfway into the overall 
procedure, articulated this knowledge by externalising drivers’ mental representation of SPADs and 
drawing on their relationship with fatigue. Since Checkland’s work, various interpretations of this 
approach have been validated by other studies as a way of assembling relevant information, 
capturing relationships and reflecting knowledge (e.g. Aginsky et al. 1997).  
Eight focus groups were undertaken with train drivers from eight different passenger train 
operators in Australia and New Zealand. A focus group was facilitated with drivers in each 
organisation by the same researcher and the aim was to discuss a variety of risk factors that 
contributed towards SPADs, of which fatigue was a key  dimension of consideration. Prior to each 
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focus group, informal unstructured observations of driving were undertaken in each organisation. 
Like the US, Australia has a differing states and differing railways, thus the observations were used 
to gain familiarity with each network, and gain first-hand experience of the signalling convention and 
various systems used in each environment, and this was subsequently used to inform the protocol.  
Figure 1 - Example data from the scenario invention task. Scenario depicts a SPAD occurrence arising 
from a combination of an inactive AWS system and manifest fatigue. 
2.2  Procedure 
During each focus group, the researcher posed a series of general questions covering general driving 
experience, understanding of different types of SPAD, individual perspectives about the equipment 
used to prevent SPADs, personal approaches for SPAD mitigation, drivers relationship with signals, 
and broader areas of potential improvement (Naweed 2013, Naweed et al., 2015a). All focus groups 
were asked two questions about fatigue as part of these general questions: “How much do you think 
fatigue contribute towards SPADs?” and, “What do you do if you feel fatigued?”.  
During the pen-paper task, probe questions were posed about each SPAD scenario to clarify the 
sequence of events, relationships with the contributing factors, and understand how they would 
affect the outcome. A further question was asked associated with fatigue: “What if the driver was 
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fatigued - how would that change the scenario/driver’s experience of the event?” This was further 
supplemented by any additional mention of fatigue in response to other probes, for example: “What 
if this scenario happened at night? Will that change the features of the scenario, and if so how?” The 
in-depth discussion that followed identified specific risks and then considered potential mitigating 
factors, providing a rich data source on train driver’s perspective of fatigue and understanding of 
sleepiness. Table 1 shows an overview of the focus group protocol with example questions. Each 
focus group lasted approximately 120 minutes.  
Table 1 – Overview of the focus group protocol (adapted from Naweed et al., 2015a). 
Class of question Example content Example question 
Ice breakers General experience, 
Organisational issues 
How does your organisation react to a SPAD? 
Prospective causation Distraction, time 
pressure, fatigue 
How much do you think fatigue contributes to 
the risk of a SPAD? 
What do you if you feel fatigued? 
Task Influence Service delivery How much does the timetable influence the 
way you drive? 
Equipment design Interface, safety systems How effective do you think AWS is for 
preventing a SPAD? 
SPAD-scenario 
generation 
Create scenario Invent a challenging SPAD Scenario 
 Probes: Influencing 
factors 
What if the driver was fatigued? How would 
that change the scenario/driver’s experience of 
the event? 
 Probes: Countermeasures What strategies have you developed to help 
you stop at a signal? 
Broader issues Areas of improvement How could a driver be better prepared for a 
SPAD event? 
 
2.3 Participants  
One focus group was conducted per organisation and between three and four drivers participated in 
each group. Each focus group typically included a new train driver (≤ 1 year experience) and two to 
three experienced drivers (≥ 10 years’ experience). There were 28 participants (26 male; mean age = 
45.67 years, SD = 8.52) in total. Twenty-two participants were from Australia and eight from New 
Zealand. The majority (78.6%) of participants had ≥10 years’ train driving experience. Focus groups 
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were conducted within the organisations to facilitate access and allow scheduling into work rosters, 
however, participation was voluntary and all participants gave informed written consent. This study 
was approved by the Central Queensland University ethics committee.   
2.4 Data analysis  
The dialogue from each focus group was transcribed verbatim, de-identified, and coded in three 
stages of qualitative thematic data analysis: (1) open coding; (2) axial coding; (3) and selective coding 
(Auerbach and Silverstein 2003, Saldana 2009). Given the size and richness of the dataset, these 
three stages of analysis created a more robust process, ensuring all data were captured and 
considered during analysis.   
The first stage (open coding) identified units of information that addressed the research aims. 
This was facilitated by in-text searches conducted for words related to fatigue, such as “fatigue”, 
“sleep”, “tired”, “monotonous”, “night”, “FAID.” Dialogue surrounding these words was isolated and 
sections of relevant text spanned from the first mention of the topic (usually by the researcher) until 
the first mention of a different topic. Text for analysis was not limited to direct responses to the 
fatigue questions. In the second stage (axial coding), the researcher organised these units into 
categories consistent with the research aims and links between categories were sought and 
subcategories were identified. Each category was considered in relation to sleepiness caused by 
sleep loss and/or circadian influence and fatigue caused by the nature of the task. In the third stage 
(selective coding), these categories were classified and divided into meaningful subcategories that 
resonated with pre-established constructs derived from fatigue risk management theory and the 
Australian passenger train-driving context and the core themes were subsequently identified. Note 
that axial coding was a critical step for relating categories and concepts with one another and 
refining the categories. Analysis was carried out using NVivo (Ver. 10, QSR) software and by two 
researchers; one researcher carried out the open coding stage and both were involved in the 
analysis for axial and selective coding.   
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3 Results 
Fatigue was discussed in every focus group. Discussions were initiated by the facilitator in the 
context of fatigue’s contribution towards SPADs. Drivers dialogue often expanded to included 
suggestions of why they experience fatigue, how fatigue impacted their work and what they did to 
mitigate its effects.  Three overarching themes pertaining to fatigue were identified: (1) causes, (2) 
consequences, and (3) countermeasures.  
3.1 Causes  
The causes of driver fatigue are presented in Table 2. Overall 9 subcategories of causes of fatigue 
were identified.  
Table 2 – Causes of driver fatigue 
Causes 
Difficulty getting to sleep 
  Hard to sleep on days off 
  Hard to sleep in the daytime 
  Family influences sleep 
  Difficulties maintaining sleep at night 
Shift work 
  Adaptation to new shift times 
  Individual differences in ability to cope with shifts 
  Shift work inherently makes you tired 
  Time of the day 
Motivation of drivers to engage in excess work when fatigued 
  Need the money 
  You should phone in sick if fatigued but might not if need the money 
  Shift swapping in a regular pattern suggests a second job 
Not providing enough opportunity for recovery 
  Inadequate time off between shifts 
  To many shifts in a row 
  Inadequate breaks between trains 
  Overtime  
Too much for drivers to do 
  Additional duties increase fatigue (e.g. wheelchair assistance) 
  Trains stopping at all stations makes you more tired 
Freight compared to passenger trains 
  Predominantly night work  
Organisational factors 
  Lack of routine 
  Inconsistency in managing shift swapping 
  Staffing issues 
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  Long shifts  
  Long driving time 
Limitations of the fatigue assessment tool 
  Fatigue assessment tool doesn’t work 
  New rosters should be tested but not on operational drivers 
  New rosters are not always better 
Poor management decision 
  Management doesn’t understand the amount of fatigue drivers experience, 
many have never been train drivers themselves 
  Managers just want the train driven and don’t care about fatigue 
  Managers themselves do not like the fatigue assessment tool.  
 
All but one focus group identified organisational factors which were causing fatigue. In particular, 
inconsistency in the management of shift swapping was frequently discussed.  Despite the common 
practice for rosters being informed by a fatigue assessment tool, almost all organisations allowed 
informal shift swapping between drivers, with one driver commenting “you can just do whatever as 
long as the job runs.” Formal checking of shift swapping against the fatigue assessment tool was only 
noted in one focus group, during which a driver commented that “you put a form in and they check 
your fatigue score and length of shift”. Limitations of the fatigue model itself were also identified as 
a cause of fatigue. Drivers did not believe the model worked. In their opinion, the imposed 
requirements did not reflect their individual experience of the fatigue resulting from various shift 
patterns. One driver raised concern that fatigue models present ideas for new rosters but particular 
shift patterns are not tested before implementation 
 While fatigue assessment should control for adequate breaks between shifts, participants 
reported that taking overtime meant there was inadequate time to recover which is not monitored 
by the employer. For example, one driver commented “They’re not looking at how much time I’m 
having off to make sure – all they’re concerned about is [...] we need a driver to cover each day off, 
[Driver 1] will work on his day off  […] they should be monitoring that more closely”. 
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Some of the difficulties with fatigue were considered to be directly related to shift work. The 
individual difference in response to shift work was noted. Drivers observed that shifts they 
personally found fatiguing did not necessarily have the same effect on others. 
 Six of the eight focus groups discussed lack of recovery time between shifts as a cause of 
fatigue. One focus group raised concerns that “a lot of jobs are pushed right out to almost 9 hours” 
resulting in an expansion of actual driving time from 4-5 hours to 6-6.5hours. The motivation for 
drivers to engage in excess work emerged as an independent factor leading to drivers taking on 
many shifts. Numerous drivers indicated that they agreed to do overtime, in spite of recognising that 
they were fatigued, suggesting that the motivation for income eclipsed concerns for safety. In one 
case it was discussed that managers actively offered overtime to those who needed the money 
rather than considering fitness for duty. 
3.2 Consequences 
The consequences arising from driver fatigue are presented in Table 3. Overall, 5 separate categories 
were identified (SPADs, distraction, cognitive impairment, organisation culture, and trains running 
late). The primary purpose of the focus groups was to discuss factors which contribute towards 
SPADs, therefore, it is to be expected that SPADs were recognised as a consequence for fatigue.  
Table 3 – Consequences arising from driver fatigue 
Consequences 
SPADs 
  Drivers report falling asleep while driving (even if there are two drivers) 
  Vigilance control test can be passed even when asleep (automated behaviour) 
Distraction (including internal) 
  Worry about driving tired 
  Fatigue makes distraction worse 
Cognitive impairment  
  Being tired impairs judgement 
  Inattention – lack of concentration 
Reactive organisation culture  
  Drivers are scared to report fatigue as it will result in a medical assessment 
  If drivers have a SPAD they won’t say if they didn’t get much sleep before 
Trains running late 
  Drivers reprioritising goals – driving slower when fatigued 
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Five groups demonstrated strong insight into their fatigue reporting both distraction and cognitive 
impairments as specific problems which result from fatigue.  
Most participants were aware of the dangers of driving when fatigued, yet half of the groups 
had discussions about a reactive culture resulting from of the presence of fatigue. Participants 
stressed that any mention of the word “fatigue” was considered taboo, and a highly reactive 
organisational culture of fear had developed around the issue. Under these circumstances, the 
participants from these groups said they were fearful of reporting fatigue to managers. For example: 
“Driver 1: And if you report that you’re sort of like fatigued and if you do that a couple of times 
then they’re sending you for a medical, basically. It triggers a medical, so you know? 
Driver 2: They don’t realise actually, we can get tired doing shifts – they don’t realise it.” 
Overall, participants were aware that fatigue had negative safety consequences, including 
SPADs. One participant recounted a time that he himself had fallen asleep while driving in a previous 
job, “I’ve woken up coming down through [Location X] one day [on a] train looked over my [co-
driver] and we’re both asleep”.  
3.3 Countermeasures  
The countermeasures used to manage driver fatigue or mitigate its effects are presented in Table 4. 
Overall, 2 categories were identified (managing fatigue prior to work and when experiencing fatigue 
during work activities); each of these had two sub categories with further layers of sub-coding. While 
drivers were asked to specifically consider SPADs, the dialogue broadened to include approaches 
beyond those explicitly related to SPADs once they started to discuss fatigue mitigation..    
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Table 4 – Countermeasures to driver fatigue 
Countermeasures  
Fo
r m
an
ag
in
g 
fa
tig
ue
-p
rio
r t
o 
ex
pe
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nc
in
g 
fa
tig
ue
 
System 
regulation 
Suggestion to use preferential roster system 
  Drivers should be able to choose the shifts the want 
Adequate employer fatigue management  
  Some employers do not provide enough recovery time 
between shifts 
Education  
  Training courses about sleep for new drivers 
Fatigue management 
  Fatigue is managed centrally through fatigue scores from the 
roster 
Self-
regulation 
Shift management  
  I can choose a good shift for me 
  Day shifts are busier than evening shifts 
Sleep management  
  Planned split sleep to fit with shift pattern 
  Get a good night’s sleep before work 
Environment regulation 
  Don’t use the heater as this puts you to sleep 
  Don’t listen to music as this puts you to sleep 
Attitudinal factors 
  I don’t get sleepy 
  I have gotten used to shift work 
W
he
n 
ex
pe
rie
nc
in
g 
fa
tig
ue
 d
ur
in
g 
w
or
k 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
During 
train 
driving 
Biomechanical  
  Stand up 
  Kneel on seat 
Biochemical 
  Drink energy drinks 
  Drink coffee 
  Smoke 
  Drink water 
Environmental regulation 
  Cold air (via air conditioner) 
  Talk to people (e.g. train guard) 
  Splash water on face 
Goal prioritisation  
  Drive slower if tired 
  Fatigue management is more important than time tables 
Before or 
after train 
driving 
Biomechanical  
  Go for a walk at the station 
  Get some (fresh) air by walking at the station  
Restricted sleep recovery 
  Have a power nap at the station 
Unrestricted sleep recovery  
  Phone in sick when fatigued  
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All focus groups discussed countermeasures. Factors which were pre-emptive countermeasures 
employed prior to the point of actually experiencing fatigue formed two distinct groups: system 
regulation, which were formal strategies put in place by the organisation, and self-regulation which 
were instigated by individuals and encompassed formal strategies recommended by the organisation 
and informal strategies employed by the drivers themselves. Self-regulation was discussed by more 
focus groups (six) than system regulation (four), hinting at a culture where drivers managed their 
own fatigue in addition to any reliance they had on organisational control. One participant felt that 
they did not have to worry about managing their fatigue on the basis of the perception that fatigue 
was being centrally regulated, meaning that if the roster said there was no fatigue risk, then it was 
fine.  
When participants were asked what they would do if they felt fatigued, the largest range of 
countermeasures were situated at the time of actually experiencing fatigue and implemented while 
driving. This included physically changing position, consuming alerting substances, and manipulating 
the environment. For example, one driver commented, “another good thing I do, actually stand up 
and drive and you’re not supposed to, but it’s that or [a SPAD]…” When talking about coffee one 
driver commented “I don’t normally drink coffee, only when I’m on shifts [at 4am] I’ll have a coffee 
[…] and that will do the desired effect to keep me awake.” In contrast, talking to people was a 
preference reported by one driver “I like people [in the cab]. It keeps me focussed, I’m able to have a 
talk and do the job where if I’m on my own I think a lot and you start staring, you know, you get 
fatigued a bit”. One participant reported reprioritising their goals by driving at a slower speed when 
tired: “To me, after the fourth train, if I’ve got to do another train and I’m tired, guess what? The old 
speed limit comes down because, fatigue management is better than running a ‘stick’” (i.e. a stop 
signal). 
Before or after driving the train, countermeasures were predominantly implemented while 
the train was stopped at stations. For example one driver reported, “… give the Guard two bells on a 
19 
 
platform and go and walk up, say hello to him and walk back.” For one participant at station, 
countermeasures included taking a “powernap.” Participants in three focus groups discussed the 
longer-term strategy to phone in sick when fatigued, although, drivers said they would not report 
“fatigue” as the actual reason because of the organisational culture around fatigue.  
4 Discussion 
The current study demonstrates that train drivers perceive fatigue to be associated with SPAD risk. 
Drivers were asked to discuss SPAD scenarios in each focus group and fatigue was unanimously 
perceived as a potential contributor. This topic of fatigue was either independently mentioned by 
the drivers or if not, raised by the facilitator. Consistent with the aims of the study SPADs were used 
as a central focus for discussions, not only because they represented an important safety issue 
within the rail industry, but also because they were a topic which all drivers would be familiar with. 
Providing a safety critical event as a focal point allowed drivers to consider fatigue within a specific 
context. It emerged that, both the “SPAD” and the “fatigue” rhetoric in the Australian and New 
Zealand rail industries are taboo and underpinned by fear, evidencing issues with organisational 
culture that is industry wide. The fear culture associated with these issues is not specific to Australia 
and can have the effect of creating a negative safety culture that impedes the development of a 
good reporting culture. A number of the presiding views held by drivers raised concerns (e.g. the 
belief that fatigue is centrally regulated), which had the effect of driving problems and 
counterintuitive thinking within the driving culture. Given that the data were contextualised on the 
risks and mitigating factors around SPADs, corresponding findings were concentrated around causes 
and countermeasures to fatigue. However, whilst the purpose of the focus groups was to discuss any 
factors that contributed to SPADs, substantial amounts of information could be identified specifically 
about fatigue. This directly supports the observation of Torsvall and Akerstedt (1987) who noted two 
train drivers failing to respond to signals while showing physiological signs of sleep. In many cases 
conversation about the consequences of fatigue expanded beyond the specific occurrence of SPADs, 
demonstrating implications for working practice more generally. Drivers could identify a range of 
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situational factors which led them to become fatigued and sleepy and employed a range of 
strategies for managing both.  
4.1 Causes 
Inconsistent management of shift swapping was the most commonly discussed cause of 
fatigue. Having a casual approach to shift swapping undermines the fatigue model within the 
assessment tool; that is it does not matter how good the assessment tool is if it is not being updated 
with when drivers are actually working. The culture of shift swapping also creates a contradictory 
message to drivers (i.e. the fatigue assessment tool is important and must be followed but shifts can 
be swapped). This may have influenced the perception that managers do not believe the fatigue 
assessment tool works.  
Even if the ideal shift model were followed, drivers demonstrated a lack in confidence of the 
shift modelling software believing this to be one cause of fatigue. This problem is not unique to 
Australian rail; for example, good practice around shift swapping feature in UK fatigue guidelines 
(Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012) as a factor that should be considered when assessing fatigue 
risks. This is achieved by gaining feedback from staff on how shift swapping is controlled and by 
determining how much control staff has over shifts that are worked (p. 33). The problem is however, 
also not unique to rail; universally, there is a deficit of controlled intervention studies on shift 
systems (Anund et al. 2015). Therefore the scientific basis for any schedule recommendation is 
limited. A further limitation is that the rosters themselves are designed around the minimum and 
maximum break times between shifts, but the amount of actual sleep obtained can never be 
controlled, which is a known limitation of fatigue modelling (Darwent et al. 2015). For example, the 
current study identified that social life, friends, and family pressures influence sleep, which are all 
factors outside of organisational control. Within aviation, guidelines suggest that employees should 
plan their personal schedules to preserve regular sleep patterns even on days off (Eurocontrol 2005). 
In contrast, the culture of shift swapping is a fatigue causal factor and for the most part, within 
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organisational control. It may be most appropriate to prioritise future strategies to reduce fatigue 
towards those causal factors within organisational control.  
The length of rail industry shifts has been a topic of recent discussion within Australia 
(Anderson et al. 2013, Dawson 2013). The data showed large inconsistencies between Australian 
states, with many states allowing industry self-regulation of fatigue management which do not 
impose a maximum shift length, whilst others impose strict work/rest guidelines. The identified 
concern for a 9h work time adds weight to the argument that 12h work shift may be excessive.  The 
strong evidence for human performance deterioration when working more than 12 hours is 
recognised by the UK Office of Rail Regulation (2011). This information is provided in UK guidance 
documents for use by the rail industry. Positively it appears that even without mandated maximum 
shift length regulation, no focus group reported problem >12h shifts, the recommended shift 
duration limit (Anderson et al 2013). In part the ability to cope with shift work is also influenced by 
individual differences. This was noted by drivers who observed that some people were better able to 
cope with particular shifts than others. This is not surprising, as there is inter-individual variability in 
response to sleep loss (Van Dongen et al. 2007). This topic was also apparent in countermeasures 
where drivers from three focus groups reported purposely swapping shifts to create a shift pattern 
that they felt to be less fatiguing for them. 
In addition to the shifts themselves, drivers also considered lack of recovery time between 
shifts to be a cause of fatigue. Previous rail research has demonstrated that significantly more sleep 
is obtained following longer (48h+) breaks than shorter breaks (Kandelaars et al. 2005). The authors 
posit that the extended break allows workers more time with family and friends without sacrificing 
their sleep. Similarly, this is recognised in UK rail guidance where the problems of consecutive shifts 
are highlighted (Office of the Rail Regulation 2011). The data revealed a culture of unmonitored 
overtime, exacerbating the problem of inadequate time to recover. At the extreme, one focus group 
discussed being able to work up to 13 days in every 14. This practice directly contradicts research 
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recommendations which note that these type of “compressed work periods” should be avoided 
(Kecklund et al. 2003).   
4.2 Consequences 
Several groups showed good insight into fatigue consequences including distraction and 
cognitive impairment. Recognising the interaction between fatigue and distraction is particularly 
important given that distraction is considered by drivers to be the leading SPAD risk (Naweed 2013). 
The aggregate consequence of fatigue and distraction has previously been demonstrated in car 
driving (Anderson and Horne 2006) but no similar empirical data is available for rail. Furthermore, 
cognitive impairment is recognised as a consequence of sleep deprivation, particularly in regards to 
decision making (Harrison and Horne 2000) so it is understandable that participants indicated they 
were experiencing these consequences. It may be beneficial for formal guidelines to identify the 
impact of fatigue on performance. For example, within aviation, European guidelines inform 
employees that fatigue increases reaction time, reduces attention, diminishes memory and results in 
withdrawn mood (Eurocontrol 2005). 
For drivers one of the most feared practical outcomes of reporting fatigue was for managers 
to require a mandatory medical assessment. A medical assessment was perceived as a threat to job 
security. Despite concern that managers may send them for a medical, participants did not talk 
about sleep disorders as a reason for fatigue. This may represent a lack of understanding of the 
prevalence and potential consequences of sleep disorders. Participants also reported fatigue 
implications for SPADs to be underreported because if a SPAD did occur, they would not be willing to 
tell an investigator that they had had little sleep. The culture of not wanting to be seen as fatigued, 
or even mentioning the word for fear of its personal implication is a concern as it would likely lead to 
drivers not reporting genuine problems. Guidelines for the UK rail industry suggest that good 
practice in fatigue management includes encouraging employees to talk about their fatigue and 
what causes it both with each other and managers (Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012). Instilling 
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an open culture on the issue of fatigue is likely to facilitate early identification before it becomes a 
safety critical issue.  
 Only one participant in the current study reported having fallen asleep while driving. 
However, it is likely that other drivers may have had micro sleeps while driving as objective 
polysomnography recordings of train drivers at work has demonstrated that sleep episodes 
frequently occur (Torsvall and Åkerstedt 1987). 
4.3 Countermeasures 
The very existence of a consequences theme points to potential failures in current fatigue 
countermeasures. Give the subjective and nuanced nature of the countermeasures identified in the 
studies and the lack of previous research revealing these kinds of data, these findings were largely 
specific to the Australian rail context. There was evidence of a reporting culture hindered by 
perceptions of diffused mutual responsibility in that some drivers reported not having to manage 
their own fatigue because they considered it to be managed by their employer. In practice however, 
fatigue management relies on individual investment and even the best shift pattern will not reduce 
fatigue if drivers do not take the opportunity to sleep during their time off work. Education about 
sleep for new drivers was also brought up. This is a common approach by rail authorities, is 
recommended practice (Kecklund et al. 2003) and may help drivers take ownership of their fatigue. 
However, there is little to no evidence about its effectiveness for train drivers (Anund et al. 2015). 
An alternative approach would be for the organisation to invoke some countermeasures to assist 
drivers, for example installing bright lights and encouraging napping if appropriate. These 
countermeasures have previously been suggested by the aviation industry (Eurocontrol, 2005). 
Additionally,  industry guidelines from the UK suggest regularly reviewing countermeasures to 
fatigue whever there is significant change to circumstance e.g. change to workload or fatigue being 
identified as a causal factor for an incident (UK Office of the Rail Regulator 2011).   
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 The countermeasures suggested by drivers include some items that will successfully 
counteract sleepiness (e.g. coffee) and some that will not (e.g. talking to people). The consumption 
of coffee and energy drinks is effective at reducing sleepiness because of the caffeine content. 
Caffeine consumption has been demonstrated as an effective way of counteracting sleepiness 
(Schweitzer et al. 2006), though frequent use can result in a build-up of tolerance (Evans and 
Griffiths 1992).  There was no suggestion that participants were educated by their organisation in 
the use of stimulants (e.g. to only use when needed) to overcome the body getting used to them and 
lowering the effects. In contrast, talking to people will not mitigate sleepiness, but could help reduce 
fatigue induced from time-on-task, as small increases in cognitive load have been shown to reduce 
fatigue (Dunn and Williamson 2012). The data also revealed “personal” strategies that while 
considered to be effective, impacted other safe working rules and regulations, such as standing up 
while driving in cabs designed for seated driving, and inviting other rail workers/people into the cab, 
both of which are generally prohibited and may migrate fatigue risk to other areas (e.g. distraction). 
These practices and perspectives do not appear to have been reported in the literature from other 
rail contexts, but are not likely to be generalisable outside Australia.  
The current work suggests that there are some rigid thoughts within the rail industry about 
fatigue, sleep and safety, but also confusion and conflict around terminology. This becomes 
important when considering appropriate mitigation strategies because effective strategies need to 
match the problem. Factors identified in the current work related to both sleepiness and fatigue 
which may be considered two distinct concepts requiring different management approaches. For 
example, fatigue associated with monotony lowers alertness, reducing the ability to react (Larue et 
al. 2011). Monotony related fatigue due to time on task can be mitigated by small increases in 
cognitive demand, such as an interactive cognitive task (Dunn and Williamson 2012). However, if a 
driver was experiencing fatigue due to sleepiness, caffeine has been demonstrated as an effective 
countermeasure (Schweitzer et al. 2006). The confusion within terminology is also apparent in rail 
industries outside of Australia, for example guidance provided by the RSSB in the UK defines fatigue 
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to result from factors related to fatigue e.g. heavy workload but also to result from inadequate sleep 
(Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012). Readdressing the understanding of fatigue and sleepiness 
may be beneficial for the rail industry more broadly, not only in Australia.  
It is apparent from this study that drivers consider fatigue to encompass a wide range of 
experiences. However, the intended focus of the word “fatigue” from the rail industry is often on 
sleep, as is apparent in a rail regulator safety bulletin section about fatigue: 
"Investigating fatigue factors requires thorough examination of individual circumstances [...] 
This should include detailed consideration of factors associated with roster patterns, commute 
times, sleep patterns, sleep deficits [...] Investigators should ascertain if there are procedures in 
place to risk-manage fatigued drivers and encourage drivers to self-declare if they have not 
received enough sleep" (Independent Transport Safety Regulator 2011, p.15). 
This raises the question of how the term “fatigue” is being interpreted and if this is important? 
Within a clinical environment, clear distinction is made between sleepiness and fatigue (Shen et al. 
2006). Where sleepiness is caused by insufficient sleep and fatigue includes sleepiness as a symptom 
but expands to wider physical and psychosocial impairment. In contrast there is greater tendency to 
use the word fatigue within transport industries as a way of encompassing aspects of sleepiness 
(Phillips 2015). This is despite guidance from leading authorities, such as the US Federal Railroad 
Administration who state that fatigue in the rail industry is “largely a function of sleep and circadian 
rhythms” (Gertler et al. 2012). It should also be noted that the situation is further complicated by a 
lack of quantification of when fatigue and/or sleepiness becomes safety critical (Van Dongen and 
Hursh 2010). 
5 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
This study provides new insight into fatigue within the context of SPADs for passenger rail operations 
as it is one of the first to consider the drivers’ perspective. There is consistent evidence that fatigue 
increases the risk of safety critical events in road transport (see Williamson et al. 2011 for a review). 
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Comparatively, fatigue in the rail industry is under investigated (Phillips 2014, Anund et al. 2015). 
Despite the implementation of existing standard fatigue countermeasures (e.g. technology 
interventions, fatigue assessment tools), the theme of fatigue consequences highlights limitations. 
The current findings demonstrate that fatigue is considered to be a problem by train drivers, and 
one that has a bearing on the incidence of SPADs, a major rail safety failure mode. Similarities 
between truck and train driving mean that findings from existing studies on some causes and 
countermeasures to fatigue can be inferred e.g. the impact of shift work (Åkerstedt 1991) and 
monotony (Larue et al. 2011), and the benefits of caffeine as a countermeasure (Horne and Reyner 
1996). However, future research within the specific rail context is essential because of the key 
differences between road and rail transport. For example, the vehicle related limitations of a train 
mean that stopping decisions must be made much earlier than for road vehicles, and it is known that 
fatigue impairs decision making (Harrison and Horne 2000). In addition, the restriction of travel on 
tracks creates a barrier to enacting some countermeasures which have been demonstrated to be 
effective for road transport, such as pulling over for a nap (Horne and Reyner 1996), making these 
less accessible to train than truck drivers.  
The strongest barrier to effective fatigue management appears to be the organisational 
culture, for example the benefits of fatigue assessment tools for roster development are limited if 
shift swapping is unregulated and a reactive fear-based organisational culture around fatigue 
reporting will limit identification of the true implications of fatigue. Future research is required to 
both undertake controlled intervention studies on shift systems (Anund et al. 2015) but also to 
consider how such shift systems should be best integrated within a workplace culture. Future 
research should also consider the relative significance of contextual differences to ensure it is 
generalisable outside of Australia. 
It is acknowledged that findings arise from drivers’ explanations surrounding fatigue and 
opinions of the causal agents and while this reveals richness within the data, they are also a 
limitation of the study. This view point is restricted by the drivers’ nuanced views and awareness of 
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this issue. For example, the UK rail industry recognises commuting time as a cause of fatigue (Rail 
Safety and Standards Board, 2012), but this was not mentioned by the drivers in the current study. 
Similarly, some important aspects from the scientific literature, such as sleep disorders, have been 
overlooked and are not considered within the results. There is also some miss-match between 
drivers perspective on causes of fatigue compared to the literature. Specifically, divers reported that 
having too much to do caused fatigue. However, the literature demonstrates that having too little to 
do is a greater causal factor of fatigue (Dunn and Williamson 2012). The presence of this particular 
fatigue cause is likely to have been influenced by recent policy changes within Australian rail, which 
have reduced the number of Guards on trains. The resultant increase in workload happened in the 
months prior to the focus groups being conducted. It is possible that increased workload would not 
be stated as a cause of fatigue if the focus groups were to be repeated, because drivers may now be 
more accustomed to their increased duties.  
A further limitation is the small sample size of drivers who participated in the focus groups. On 
average there were 3 to 4 participants per focus groups and comparisons between organisations was 
limited. Recruiting emphasis was placed on trying to represent every rail passenger organisation 
within Australia and New Zealand rather than on overall participant numbers, which strengthened 
the representativeness of findings across this region, however, limiting the number of drivers. 
Having considered a rich account of the driver’s perspective, future research should engage with all 
organisational levels and representatives from the entire system to consider how organisations as a 
whole approach fatigue management. This is important because fatigue management is a shared 
responsibility between employer and employee. For example, from the current work ‘inconsistency 
in managing shift swapping’ is influenced by drivers asking to swap shifts as much as it is employers 
failing to manage swaps.  
In the future, train driving is likely to become more automated and the potential for task-
induced fatigue will increase. At the same time, the shift work basis is likely to remain, and continue 
to cause sleepiness resulting from circadian and sleep pattern interruption (Åkerstedt 1991). 
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Ensuring that fatigue and sleepiness concepts are properly understood could be a first step to 
informing specific interventions to reduce driver fatigue and sleepiness.  
6 Acknowledgements  
The authors gratefully acknowledge the Australian Research Council for facilitating this study 
(Project number: DE160101137), which drew on data supported by the CRC for Rail Innovation 
(established and supported under the Australian Government’s Cooperative Research Centres 
program. The fatigue focused analysis for this article has been supported by the CQUniversity 
HEALTH CRN www.cqu.edu.au/crn and the Australian Government's Collaborative Research 
Networks Program. 
References 
Aginsky, V., C. Harris, R. Rensink, and J. Beusmans. 1997. “Two Strategies for Learning a Route in a 
Driving Simulator.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 17 (4): 317–331. 
Åkerstedt, T., 1991. Shift work and sleep disturbances. Sleep and health rísk. Springer, pp. 265-278. 
Anderson, C., Grunstein, R., Rajaratnam, S., 2013. Hours of work and rest in the rail industry. Internal 
medicine journal 43 (6), 717-721. 
Anderson, C., Horne, J., 2006. Sleepiness enhances distraction during a monotonous task. Sleep 29 
(4), 573. 
Anund, A., Fors, C., Kecklund, G., Leeuwen, W.V., Åkerstedt, T., 2015. Countermeasures for fatigue in 
transportation: a review of existing methods for drivers on road, rail, sea and in aviation. 
Retrieved 09 June 2015, from 
http://www.vti.se/en/publications/countermeasures-for-fatigue-in-transportation--a-
review-of-existing-methods-for-drivers-on-road-rail-sea-and-in-aviation/ 
Auerbach, C.F., Silverstein, L.B., 2003. Qualitative data: An introduction to coding and analysis NYU 
press. 
Australasian Railway Association, 2016. Committees and groups. Retrieved Septemner 1st, from 
https://www.ara.net.au/about-us/committees-and-groups 
Bartley, S.H. & Chute, E. Fatigue and impairment in man. 1947. McGraw-Hill Book Company 
Checkland, P. 1980. Systems Thinking, Systems Practice. Chichester: Wiley. 
Darwent, D., Dawson, D., Paterson, J.L., Roach, G.D., Ferguson, S.A., 2015. Managing fatigue: It really 
is about sleep. Accident Analysis & Prevention 82, 20-26. 
Dawson, D., 2013. Hours of work and rest in the rail industry: To prescribe or not to prescribe, that is 
the question. Internal medicine journal 43 (9), 959-961. 
Dement, W.C. & Carskadon, M.A. Current perspectives on daytime sleepiness: the issues. Journal of 
Sleep Research & Sleep Medicine, 1982, 5(Suppl 2): 56-66 
Dorrian, J., Baulk, S.D., Dawson, D., 2011. Work hours, workload, sleep and fatigue in Australian Rail 
Industry employees. Applied ergonomics 42 (2), 202-209 
Dorrian, J., Hussey, F., Dawson, D., 2007. Train driving efficiency and safety: examining the cost of 
fatigue. Journal of Sleep Research 16 (1), 1-11. 
29 
 
Dorrian, J., Roach, G.D., Fletcher, A., Dawson, D., 2006. The effects of fatigue on train handling 
during speed restrictions. Transportation research part F: traffic psychology and behaviour 9 
(4), 243-257. 
Dunn, N., Williamson, A., 2012. Driving monotonous routes in a train simulator: the effect of task 
demand on driving performance and subjective experience. Ergonomics 55 (9), 997-1008. 
Eurocontrol, 2005. Fatigue and sleep management – personal strategies for decreasing the effects of 
fatigue in air traffic control. DAS/HUM. Retrived 01 September, 2016, from 
http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/2867/managing_rail_fatigue.pdf 
Evans, S.M., Griffiths, R.R., 1992. Caffeine tolerance and choice in humans. Psychopharmacology 108 
(1-2), 51-59. 
Gander, P., Hartley, L., Powell, D., Cabon, P., Hitchcock, E., Mills, A., Popkin, S., 2011. Fatigue risk 
management: Organizational factors at the regulatory and industry/company level. Accident 
Analysis & Prevention 43 (2), 573-590. 
Gertler, J., DiFiore, A., & Raslear, T., 2012. Fatigue Status of the U.S. Railroad Industry (Tech. Rep. 
DOT/FRA/ORD-13/06). US Department of Transportation, Washington, DC: Federal Railroad 
Administration. 
Gouin, V., Sagot, J.C., Roussel, B., 2001. Train drivers’ fatigue during a seven hour daytime trip. In: 
Harris, D. (Ed.), Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics, vol. 5: Aerospace and 
Transportation Systems. Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, Hampshire, pp. 455–462. 
Harrison, Y., Horne, J.A., 2000. The impact of sleep deprivation on decision making: a review. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Applied 6 (3), 236. 
Horne, J. A., & Reyner, L. A. (1996). Counteracting driver sleepiness: effects of napping, caffeine, and 
placebo. Psychophysiology, 33(3), 306-309. 
Howarth, H.D., Tepas, D.I., 2001. Using graphs to evaluate the impact of work shifts: an experimental 
investigation. Human factors/ergonomics: it works. Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 45th Annual Meeting, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota, October 8–12, 
2001, vol. 2. The Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Santa Monica, CA, pp. 1240–1244. 
Howard, M.E., Desai, A.V., Grunstein, R.R., Hukins, C., Armstrong, J.G., Joffe, D., et al. Sleepiness, 
sleep-disordered breathing, and accident risk factors in commercial vehicle drivers (see 
comment) American Journal of Respiratory & Critical Care Medicine, 170 (9) (2004), pp. 
1014–1021 
Independent Transport Safety Regulator, 2011. Managing signals passed at danger.  
Jay, S.M., Dawson, D., Lamond, N., 2006. Train drivers' sleep quality and quantity during extended 
relay operations. Chronobiology international 23 (6), 1241-1252. 
Kandelaars, K.J., Lamond, N., Roach, G.D., Dawson, D., 2005. The impact of extended leave on sleep 
and alertness in the Australian rail industry. Industrial health 43 (1), 105-113. 
Kecklund, L., Olsson, E., Jansson, A., Kecklund, G., Ingre, M., 2003. The TRAIN-project: effects of 
organizational factors, automatic train control, work hours and environment: suggestions for 
safety enhancing measures. In: Proceedings of the Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, pp. 1835-1839. 
Kreuger, R. A., 1994. Focus groups: A practical guide for applied research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Larue, G.S., Rakotonirainy, A., Pettitt, A.N., 2011. Driving performance impairments due to 
hypovigilance on monotonous roads. Accident Analysis & Prevention 43 (6), 2037-2046. 
Metro Trains Melbourne. 2015 “SPAD Risk Managment.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the SPAD Conference, Queensland, February. 
Morgan, D. L. 1997. Focus groups as qualitative research. Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage. 
National Rail Safety Regulator 2014. Preparation of a Rail Safety Management System Guideline. 
Retrieved 09 June 2015, from 
http://www.onrsr.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/1923/Preparation_of_a_Rail_SMS.P
DF 
30 
 
Naweed, A., Balakrishnan, G., Bearman, C., Dorrian, J., Dawson, D., 2012. Scaling generative scaffolds 
towards train driving expertise. In: Anderson, M. (Ed.), Contemporary Ergonomics and 
Human Factors 2012: Proceedings of the International Conference on Ergonomics & Human 
Factors 2012. CRC Press, Blackpool, UK, p. 235. 
Naweed, A., 2013. Psychological factors for driver distraction and inattention in the Australian and 
New Zealand rail industry. Accident Analysis & Prevention 60, 193-204. 
Naweed, A., Hockey, G., Clarke, S.D., 2013. Designing simulator tools for rail research: the case study 
of a train driving microworld. Applied ergonomics 44 (3), 445-454. 
Naweed, A., Rainbird, S., Chapman, J., 2015a. Investigating the formal countermeasures and 
informal strategies used to mitigate SPAD risk in train driving. Ergonomics (ahead-of-print), 
1-14. 
Naweed, A., Rainbird, S., Dance, C., 2015b. Are you fit to continue? Approaching rail systems 
thinking at the cusp of safety and the apex of performance. Safety Science, 76, 101-110.. 
Office of Rail Regulation, 2011. Managing Rail Staff Fatigue - Retrieved 01 September, 2016, from 
http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/2867/managing_rail_fatigue.pdf 
Phillips, R., Sagberg, F., 2010. Helping train drivers pass signals safely: Lessons from 10 case studies. 
Oslo: Transportøkonomisk institutt. 
Phillips, R.O., 2014. What is fatigue and how does it affect the safety performance of human 
transport operators? (Tech. Report 1351/2014). Institute of Transport Economics. 
Norwegian Centre for Transport Research: Olso, Norway. 
Retrieved 09 June 2015, from 
https://www.toi.no/publications/what-is-fatigue-and-how-does-it-affect-the-safety-
performance-of-human-transport-operators-article32800-29.html 
Phillips, R.O., 2015. A review of definitions of fatigue–And a step towards a whole definition. 
Transportation research part F: traffic psychology and behaviour 29, 48-56. 
Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2012. Managing fatigue – A good practice guide (Tech. Report 
RS/504 Issue 1). Retrived 01 September 2016, from 
http://www.rssb.co.uk/rgs/standards/RS504%20Iss%201.pdf) 
Saldana, J. 2009. An introduction to codes and coding. The Coding Manual for Qualitative 
Researchers. London, UK: Sage. 
Schweitzer, P.K., Randazzo, A.C., Stone, K., Erman, M., Walsh, J.K., 2006. Laboratory and field studies 
of naps and caffeine as practical countermeasures for sleep-wake problems associated with 
night work. Sleep 29 (1), 39-50. 
Shen, J., Barbera, J., Shapiro, C.M., 2006. Distinguishing sleepiness and fatigue: focus on definition 
and measurement. Sleep medicine reviews 10 (1), 63-76. 
Torsvall, L. Åkerstedt, T. (1987). Sleepiness on the job: continuously measured EEG changes in train 
drivers. Electroencephalography and clinical Neurophysiology,66(6), 502-511. 
Van Dongen, H., Hursh, S., 2010. Fatigue, performance, errors, and accidents. Principles and practice 
of sleep medicine 5, 753-759. 
Van Dongen, H.P., Mott, C.G., Huang, J.-K., Mollicone, D.J., Mckenzie, F.D., Dinges, D.F., 2007. 
Optimization of biomathematical model predictions for cognitive performance impairment 
in individuals: accounting for unknown traits and uncertain states in homeostatic and 
circadian processes. Sleep 30 (9), 1129-1143. 
Wilson, J.R. and B.J. Norris, Rail human factors: Past, present and future. Applied Ergonomics, 2005. 
36(6): p. 649-660. 
Williamson, A., Lombardi, D. A., Folkard, S., Stutts, J., Courtney, T. K., & Connor, J. L., 2011. The link 
between fatigue and safety. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 43(2), 498-515.  
Williamson, A., Lombardi, D. A., Folkard, S., Stutts, J., Courtney, T. K., & Connor, J. L., 2011. The link 
between fatigue and safety. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 43(2), 498-515. 
 Young, S., Hashemi, L., 1996. Fatigue and trucking accidents: two modes of accident causation. 
Paper presented at the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 1996.  
31 
 
 
 
